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Forcible Sexual Abuse.

Although the Information was read to the

Appellant, the trial judge did not elicit a factual basis for the
plea on the record.

Accordingly, the trial court abused its

discretion by refusing to permit the Appellant to withdraw a
defective Rule 11(e) plea.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Appellant pleaded guilty to the charge of Forcible Sexual
Abuse, a second degree felony, on August 3, 1984, and was ordered
to serve the indeterminate term provided by law of 1-15 years at
the Utah State Prison.

The Appellant has served his sentence at

the Utah State Prison and is presently on parole. The Appellant's
liberty is impaired as a result of a variety of restrictions
imposed as a condition of his parole.
On May 3, 1989, the Appellant filed a motion to withdraw his
previously entered guilty plea.

The basis of the motion was that

the trial court had failed to comply with the rules and regulations
imposed upon the trial court by Rule 11(e) of the Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure.
On July 26, 1989, the trial court heard evidence to set aside
the plea. The Appellant testified he had an eighth grade education
as well as some carpentry classes at a trade school (R.4.).

He

testified his lawyer did not advise him of the rights he waived by
pleading guilty (R.6).

He testified his lawyer never specifically

2

advised him of the title of the crime to which he pleaded; nor was
there any discussion of the elements of the offense (R.7).

The

Appellant denied knowing the elements of Forcible Sexual Abuse, nor
what facts he admitted by entering his plea on August 3, 1984 •
(R.7).

He stated that he pleaded guilty to protect his family from

any further suffering (R.8).

Detective Wall also testified•

He

related that the Appellant told him he had touched the genitals and
breasts of his daughter (R.17).

The detective had no doubt that

the Appellant understood the nature of the acts he had performed
with his daughter (R.17).

The detective claimed he reviewed with

the Appellant the elements of all the different crimes that the
Appellant could have faced (R.18).

The detective remembered that

the Appellant was crying and very emotional during the interviewconfession and during the discussion of the elements to the various
crimes (R.28).

The detective conceded that he did not know what

the Appellant understood he was pleading guilty to on the date of
the entry of the guilty plea (R.29).
At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, after listening
to the arguments of counsel, the trial court denied the Appellant's
motion to withdraw his guilty plea, and ruled that the record as
a whole demonstrated that the Appellant entered his guilty plea
with a full understanding of his rights, including the right
against self-incrimination; and that the Appellant was aware of the
3

nature and elements of the offense at the time he entered his
guilty plea.

See Appendix 1.

The Appellant appeals that finding

and the denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE RECORD AS A WHOLE DOES NOT AFFIRMATIVELY ESTABLISH
APPELLANT'S FULL KNOWLEDGE AND UNDERSTANDING OF THE
CONSEQUENCES OF HIS PLEA UNDER RULE 11(e)(3) AND (4)
At the time that the Appellant pleaded guilty to Forcible
Sexual Abuse, the trial court erred by failing to comply with the
requirements of Rule 11(e)(3) which states:
The court..•shall not accept [a plea of
guilty] until the court has made the findings:
(3)
That the defendant knows he has rights
against compulsory self-incrimination, to a
jury trial and to confront and cross-examine
in open court the witnesses against him, and
that by entering the plea he waives all of
those rights;
(4) That the defendant understands the nature
and elements of the offense to which he is
entering the plea; that upon trial the prosecution would have the burden of proving each
of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt;
and that the plea is an admission of all those
elements;
The record evidence from the change of plea hearing clearly
establishes that the trial court failed to find that the Appellant
understood the nature and elements of Forcible Sexual Abuse and
that by entering a guilty plea he necessarily waived his constitu4

tional rights 1) against compulsory self-incrimination; 2) to a
jury trial; and 3) to confront and cross-examine in open court the
witnesses against him. Failure to comply with the mandates of Rule
11(e) is good cause to set the plea aside.
The appropriate inquiry to assess Rule 11(e) compliance is
whether the record as a whole affirmatively establishes that the
Appellant entered his plea with full knowledge and understanding
of its consequences.

Warner v. Morris, 709 P.2d 309 (Utah 1985)

and Brooks v. Morris, 709 P.2d 310 (Utah 1985).

In

State

v.

Gibbons, 740 P. 2d 1309 (Utah 1987), the Utah Supreme Court held
that "11(e) squarely places on trial courts the burden of insuring
constitutional and Rule 11(e) requirements are complied with when
a guilty plea is entered." Id at 1312. Admittedly, because Gibbons
was decided after the guilty plea was entered in this case, the
strict compliance Rule 11(e) established under Gibbons does not
control.

However, the rationale expressed in Gibbons is instruc-

tive in this case.
The basis for the Gibbons duty imposed upon trial courts is
found in Boykin v. Alabama, supra, where the U.S. Supreme Court
stated:
What is at stake for an accused facing [punishment] demands the utmost solicitude of
which courts are capable in canvassing the
matter with the accused to make sure he has a
full understanding of what the plea connotes
and of its consequence.
5

395 U.S. at 243-244.
The significance attached to an accused understanding the
nature of the charge to which he pleads guilty seems more than
obvious.

In Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637 (1976), the United

States Supreme Court observed:
"Clearly the plea could not be voluntary in
the sense that it constituted an intelligent
admission that he committed the offense unless
the Defendant received real notice of the true
nature of the charge against him, the first
and most universally recognized requirement of
due process."
Moreover, Rule 11(e)(4) mandates that in order for a defendant
to make a knowing guilty plea, he must understand the elements of
the crime charged and the relationship of the law to the facts.
In McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459 (1969), the United
States Supreme Court stressed that the factual elements of the
charges against the Defendant must be explained in the taking of
a guilty plea so that the Defendant understands and admits those
elements:
. . .the judge must determine "that the conduct which the defendant admits constitute the
offense charged in the Indictment or Information or offense included therein to which the
Defendant has pleaded guilty." . . .
There is no adequate substitute for demonstrating in the record at the time the plea is
entered the Defendant's understanding of the
nature of the charge against him. (Emphasis
in the original).
6

The total absence of any colloquy between the Court and the
Appellant concerning the facts and the elements in the instant
matter are to be contrasted with the exchange between the trial
judge and the defendant in Jolivet v. Cook, 115 Utah Adv. Rep. 17
(Utah 1989).

There the Information was read to the defendant in

open court at the first arraignment.

However, at the defendant's

request, the Amended Information was not read.

The defendant's

counsel advised the Court that the defendant had read the Amended
Information

and knew

its contents.

Moreover, the defendant

personally advised the judge he had read the Amended Information,
understood its contents, and waived its reading.

At the second

District Court arraignment, the defendant's counsel again requested
waiving the reading of the Amended Information. However, the judge
did read it together with the facts relating to the charges.

The

judge asked the defendant if the facts read in open court were
fairly and fully stated, to which the defendant responded affirmatively.

On these pre-Gibbons facts, the Utah Supreme Court held

that the record as a whole demonstrated Rule 11(e)(4) compliance.
In contrast, in the instant matter, the record as a whole does not
demonstrate that the Appellant understood or admitted facts which
constituted the offense to which he pleaded guilty.
The only support in the record at the time the plea was
entered for the trial judge's finding that Appellant understood the
7

nature and elements of Forcible Sexual Abuse is that the Information was read to him at the outset of the guilty plea hearing.
However, that can hardly be said to compare to the steps taken by
the trial judge in Jolivet v. Cook, supra, to insure that the
accused understood the elements of the offense.
United States, supra.

See McCarthy v.

Thus, in State v. Valencia, 776 P.2d 1332

(Utah App. 1989), this Court stated at page 1335:
For example defendant was not specifically
advised on the record by the court as to the
nature and the elements of the offense to
which he pleaded or its consequences,
mandating that we reverse the conviction and
refusal to set aside the plea.
Before the trial court, the State also relied upon the
Appellant's confession and statement to the agent preparing the
presentence report to demonstrate that the Appellant understood the
nature and elements of Forcible Sexual Abuse on the date he entered
his guilty plea.

Appellant submits that reliance on these two

different events is misplaced.

First and foremost, both of these

events occurred at different chronological times than the date of
the guilty plea.

It is the accused's understanding of the offense

on the date that he enters his plea that is crucial.

His admis-

sions of wrongdoing on a date before and after the entry of his
guilty plea do not necessarily shed any light on the Appellant's
understanding of his rights on the date he entered his guilty plea.
State v. Vasilacapulos, 756 P.2d 92 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
8

"His

understanding of the elements of the charges and the relationship
of the laws and the facts may not be presumed from a silent or
incomplete examination."

State v. Valencia, supra, at page 1335.

To do so is to speculate.
The trial court also neglected to advise the Defendant that
he had a right against compulsory self-incrimination, a right to
a jury trial, a right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses
against him in open court, and that by entering a guilty plea, he
waived all of those rights.

"Specific inquiry should be made as

to whether defendant understands that by his plea he waives his
rights against self-incrimination, to a jury trial, to appeal, and
to confront witnesses."

State v. Valencia, supra, at 1335. Thus,

the record shows there was no compliance with Rule 11(e)(3).
CONCLUSION
The Appellant's plea was not entered in compliance with the
constitutional and Rule 11(e)(3) and (4) requirements. The record
as a whole does not demonstrate that the Appellant understood any
of the elements of Forcible Sexual Abuse on the date that he
pleaded guilty.

Similarly, the record does not demonstrate any

mention by the trial court that the entry of the guilty plea waived
the Appellant's constitutional rights against self-incrimination,
to cross-examination and confrontation of witnesses, and to a jury

9

trial.

The trial court abused its discretion by refusing to set

the guilty plea aside.
DATED this

day of

, 1990.

WALTER F. BUGDEN, JR.,
Attorney for Appellant
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused four (4) true and correct
copies of the foregoing Appellant's Brief to be mailed, by first
class postage prepaid, this
day of
, 1990, to:
Attorney General's Office
236 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
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APPENDIX 1

FN TIIF FOURTH JUrUCJAI, DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
*******

STATE OF UTAH,,

)

Plaintiff,

Case Number

9266

)

vs.

)

CHARLES EDWARD CONOVER,

)

Defendant.

FINDINGS AND ORDER

)
********

This
for
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GuLJty

evidentiary
Flea.

appeared
counsel
file

matter

came

before

hearing

Deputy

on

Utah

with

the

F. Bugden, Jr.
Court,

the

defendant's

County

for the State of Utah.
Walter

the Court,

on

July

Motion

Attorney,

26,

1989,

to

Withdraw

Claudia

Laycock,

The defendant was present
After

additional

reviewing
case

law

with

the pleadings
presented

to

on
the

Court at the hearing, and after hearing testimony offered by both
the State and the defendant, the Court finds that the record

as a

whole

plea

with

demonstrates
a

against
and

full

the

understanding

self-incrimination,

eLements

p I ea .

that

of

the offense

defendant

of
and
at
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rights,

that
the

entered

he was
Lime

his

guilty

including
aware of

he entered

the

right

the

nature

his

guilty

Based upon the above, defendant's motion to withdraw
guilty plea is denied.
Dated this 19th day of September, 1989.
BY THE COURT:

J/ ROBERT BULLdCK
SENIOR DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
cc:

Claudia Laycock
Deputy Utah County Attorney
County Building
Provo, UT 84601
Walter F. Bugden, Jr.
257 Towers, Suite 340
257 East 200 South - 10
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

APPENDIX 2

UTAH RULES OK CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
AX.R. — Antagonistic defenses as ground
xx separate trials of codefendants in criminal
a*. 82 A.L.R.3d 245.

Rule

11

Key Numbers. — Indictment and Information <s=> 124 to 131.

Rule 10. Arraignment*
'a) Upon the return of an indictment or upon receipt of the records from the
magistrate following a bind-over, the defendant shall forthwith be arraigned
2 the district court. Arraignment shall be conducted in open court and shall
insist of reading the indictment or information to the defendant or stating to
rm the substance of the charge and calling on him to plead thereto. He shall
5e given a copy of the indictment or information before he is called upon to
:Jead.
>b) If upon arraignment the defendant requests additional time in which to
;!ead or otherwise respond, a reasonable time may be granted.
c) Any defect or irregularity in or want or absence of any proceeding pror.ded for by statute or these rules prior to a r r a i g n m e n t shall be specifically
*sd expressly objected to before a plea of guilty is entered or the same is
raived.
«d) If a defendant has been released on bail, or on his own recognizance,
rrior to arraignment and thereafter fails to appear for arraignment or trial
Then required to do so, a w a r r a n t of arrest may issue and bail may be forfeited.
T7-35-10, enacted by L. 1980, ch. 14, 5 1.)
Cross-References.
i 77-35-30.

-

Harmless

••rror.

Rights of accused. Utah Const . Art. L Sees 7
to l.T. * 77-1-0

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Additional time to plead.
Where original information did not state
rjblic offense and was amended so as to state
rjblicoffense for first time, as amending inforration in larceny prosecution so as to allege
rmership of property alleged to have been sto-

U«n. it was equivalent of a new information requiring arraignment of defendant and his plea
thereto, and where defendant was not given
time to plead to such information, court cornmitted reversible error. State v. Jensen. 83
Utah 452, .'JO P.2d 203 (1934).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. - 21 Am J u r 2d Criminal
Law §§ 433 to 438.
C.J.S. — 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law ** 404,
407. 411.

Key Numbers.
263, 264.

Criminal Law «=> 261(1),

Rule 11. Pleas.
(a) Upon arraignment, except in case of an infraction, a defendant shall be
represented by counsel, unless the defendant waives counsel in open court,
and shall not be required to plead until he has had a reasonable time to confer
with counsel.
(b) A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, no contest, not guilty by
reason of insanity or guilty and mentally ill. A defendant may plead in the
alternative not guilty or not guilty by reason of insanity. If a defendant remses to plead or if a defendant corporation fails to appear, the court shall
enter a plea of not guilty.
:M9

Rule

11

UTAH KULKS OK TRIMINAL PROCEDURE

(c) A defendant may plead no contest only with the consent of the cour.
(d) When a defendant enters a plea of not guilty, the case shall forthwith b?
set for trial. Defendants unable to make bail shall be given a preference for an
early trial. In non-felony cases the court shall advise the defendant, or hi?
counsel, of the requirements for making a written demand for a jury trial
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty or no contest and shaL
not accept such a plea until the court has made the findings:
(1) That if the defendant is not represented by counsel he has knowingly waived his right to counsel and does not desire counsel;
(2) That the plea is voluntarily made;
(3) That the defendant knows he has rights against compulsory selfincrimination, to a jury trial and to confront and cross-examine in open
court the witnesses against him, and that by entering the plea he waives
all of those rights;
(4) That the defendant understands the nature and elements of the
offense to which he is entering the plea; t h a t upon trial the prosecution
would have the burden of proving each of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt; and that the plea is an admission of all those elements;
(5) That the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence
t h a t may be imposed upon him for each offense to which a plea is entered,
including the possibility of the imposition of consecutive sentences; and
(6) Whether the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion and
plea agreement and if so, what agreement has been reached.
If it appears that the prosecuting attorney or any other party has
agreed to request or recommend the acceptance of a plea to a lesser included offense, or the dismissal of other charges, the same shall be approved by the court. If recommendations as to sentence are allowed by the
court, the court shall advise the defendant personally that any recommendation as to sentence is not binding on the court.
(f) The judge shall not participate in plea discussions prior to any agreement being made by the prosecuting attorney, but once a tentative plea agreement has been reached which contemplates entry of a plea in the expectation
t h a t other charges will be dropped or dismissed, the judge, upon request of the
parties, may permit the disclosure to him of such tentative agreement and the
reasons therefor in advance of the time for tender of the plea. The judge may
then indicate to the prosecuting attorney and defense counsel whether he will
approve the proposed disposition. Thereafter, if the judge decides that final
disposition should not be handled in conformity with the plea agreement, he
shall so advise the defendant and then call upon the defendant to either affirm
or withdraw his plea.
(77-35-11, enacted by L. 1980, ch 14, § 1; L. 1983, ch. 49, § 6.)
A m e n d m e n t Notes. — The 1983 amendment, in Subdivision <b». added "not guilty by
reason of insanity or guilty and menlallv ill" to
the first sentence and added the second sentence

Cross-References. — Inadmissibility of
pleas, plea discussions or related statements.
Rule 410, U.R.E.

350

